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The purpose of my study is to examine how the United States and Japan interact in a 
strategic setting on foreign economic issues. Since relations between the two countries 
have been developing for several decades now, I will look into: I) the historical 
component of the relationship between Japan and the U. S. through a case study, and 2) 
the theoretical implications through an experiment. Besides historical significance, the 
case has important theoretical ramifications for the study of foreign interactions with 
strategic information. The theoretical aspect would help to explain how the U. S. makes 
decisions for current issues. 3) I will also introduce an analytical component to model and 
study foreign economic relations between these countries. 
Foreign economic policy is one of the top priorities for the U. S. government as it 
enters the 21st century. As the United States rose as a world power, foreign economic 
relations with other countries along with security interests became of up-most 
importance. The U. S. government has taken the role of leader all over the world at the 
United Nations, in the Middle East, Europe, and in Asia. Even with the U. S. as a world 
leader in the post cold war era, competition is becoming fiercer and economic strategy 
must be keen. In order to keep military peace around the world as well as economic 
prosperity, world leaders must not take foreign affairs lightly. Notably important is the 
economic aspect of foreign relations. With a globalization of markets, all countries 
depend on one another to provide goods and services for their people. Investment and 
trade are so widely abundant that economic relations must be cordial as well as strategic. 
Countries must be cooperative and knowledgeable of economic factors. 
For this study, I examined a specific case study in which the U. S. was in a dispute 
with a foreign country and how the U. S. dealt with the situation. This particular dispute 
spans a timeline of 15 years and involves the automotive industry of Japan and the U. S. 
Next, I used an experiment to gather empirical data to further explore decision making in 
foreign policy. I employed 26 students as subjects for an experiment run on the Program 
for Foreign Policy Decision Making's computerized decision board developed by Dr. 
Alex Mintz. The subjects are presented with a scenario modeling the historical dispute 
between Japan and the U. S, From the data, evidence can be drawn to determine the 
"why" of each student's decision. This study seeks to show that there is a pattern of 
decision-making in U. S. foreign policy and can be modeled through decision-making 
theories, 
To Josh, 
who encourages me to work hard at everything I do, 
surprises me everyday with his wit and intelligence, 
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1NTRODUCT10jxl 
1. The Challenge 
The purpose of my study is io examine how the United States and Japan interact in a 
strategic setting on foreign economic issues. Since relations betv'een thc two countries 
have been developing for several decades now, I will look into: I) the historical 
component of the relationship between Japan and the U. S. through a case study, and 2) 
the theoretical implications through an experiment. Besides historical significance, the 
case has important thcorctical ramifications for the study of foreign interactions with 
strategic information. The theoretical aspect would help to explain how the U. S. makes 
decisions for current issues. 3) I will also introduce an analytical component to model 
and study foreign economic relations between these countries. 
2. The importance of this Study 
Foreign economic policy is one ol' the top priorities for the 1). S. government as it 
enters the 21st century. As the United States rose as a world power, foreign economic 
relations with other countries along with security interests became of up-most 
importance. The U. S. government has taken the role of leader all over the world at the 
1 lnited Nations, in the Middle East, Europe, and in Asian. Even with the U. S. as a worM 
leader in the post cold war era, competition is becoming fiercer and economic strategy 
This thesis tollows the style and format of American Journal of Political Science. 
must be keen. In order to keep military peace around the world as well as economic 
prosperity, world leaders must not take foreign affairs lightly. Notably important is the 
economic aspect of foreign relations. With a globalization of markets, all countries 
depend on one another to provide goods and services for their people. Investment and 
trade are so widely abundant that economic relations must be cordial as well as strategic. 
Countries must be cooperative and knowledgeable of economic factors. 
3. Prior Research 
According to researchers in Wittkoff s The Future of American Forei n Polic, 
there is no reason to believe that relations between the U. S. and Japan will turn sour. 
"Japan's rise as a global economic and financial power may nonetheless erode some of 
the most fundamental sources of U. S. power. The challenge to the Unites States is clear. 
As a rising power Japan, will in the not too distant future, face a number of strategic 
choices in the economic, political, and military realms. These choices could have a 
profound impact not only on the U. S. -Japan relationship, but also on the nature of the 
post-Cold War world and the role the United States will play in it" (1994). With the 
Soviet Union no longer a threat, the U. S. and Japan no longer have a common ground in 
Asia. "If the United States is to preserve its latitude for influencing events on a global 
scale, it must ensure that the strategic choices that Japan makes will be those that most 
closely match U. S. interests. The challenge facing the United States, then, is to forge a 
strategy toward Japan that will secure U. S. interests well into the next century" (1994). 
Therefore, it is important to understand U. S. strategy towards Japan. 
Other scholars have developed strategies that they feel would be useful in 
keeping security interests and economic interdependence between the U. S. and Japan. 
These are Deslter and Nacht's guidelines for a favorable future between the two 
countries from their book, U. S. Polic towards Ja an: 
l. A basis for retaining security cooperation under a condition of reduced threat and 
increased concern about technological competition; 
2. Shoring up areas of weakness in the U. S. domestic economy to strengthen the U. S. 
foundation of cooperation and competition with Japan; 
3. Continued U. S. efforts to open up the Japanese economy through processes and 
substantive agreements that become progressively more one-sided in substance as well 
as form; 
4. An explicit strategy of reinforcing and deepening economic interdependence; and 
5. Articulation of "competitive interdependence" as an explicit alternative to the U. S. — 
Japanese economic nationalism (1993). 
During the past few decades, U. S. -Japan security relations have grown stronger. 
The U. S. made a commitment to preserve security in Japan as she developed into a 
democratic country. The presence of U. S. troops in Japan also extended U. S. strength 
over the Asian mainland. In its commitment to containment, the U. S. also deterred 
Soviet interests in Asia by protecting Japan. By the 1980s, the relationship between 
Japan and U. S. had become strong. The V. S. had Japan's cooperation in defense 
operations. "It evolved also from U. S. military and commercial sales in the 1960s to 
licensed production of American systems in Japan in the 1970s and early, to co- 
production in the early 1980s" (Wooley 1988). Yet today, Japan has become superior in 
many military technologies leaving Washington concerned about Japan becoming a 
potential danger to American military power. 
As defense cooperation improves, economic relations grew as well. According to 
Deslter and Nacht, the U. S. must be concerned with the impact of Japanese products on 
U. S. producers and markets, expanded trade through breaking down of Japanese barriers 
to American products, Japanese surpluses and growing U. S deficits, intervention in 
foreign exchange markets, Japanese success in high tech, triggered anxieties in the 
defense establishment about U. S. technological leadership, security leakage, and capital 
flows &om Japan to the U. S. , all which reflect the overall shift of incentive economic 
power (1993). As these issues emanate over the decades, the U. S. must become more 
competent in management of foreign economic competition. 
PROBLEM 
Alternatives and Dimensions 
I'hc United Staies has many options it can employ in dealing with international 
dilemmas. The most relevant actions in my particular case study that v ere documented 
can be narrowed down to four options. The aiternatises include -do nothing", "ncgotiaic 
the proposal'. "impose tariffs on luxury cars", or "impose greater sanctions" on imports. 
Each of these options can be viewed from different standpoints. The decision-maker in 
this dispute, U. S. government leaders, had three main dimensions to consider in 
choosing an alternative. Their choice was affected by political. economical, and 
diplomatic factors. Each had an impact on whether or not an alternative is desirable. 
If the leaders decided to do nothing, the impact of the dimensions vary. 
Politically, this was a risky choice. The leaders in the I J. S. automotive industry were 
tired of lack of fair competition that existed and wanted the government to take a stand 
and fight for fair-trading. U. S. workers, businesses, and consumers were suffering from 
thc lack of opportunity both in the I J. S. and in . Japan (Kantor 1995). Likewise, this move 
would not help the economic dimension since it would fail to decrease the deficit and 
possibly permit the gap to increase. Although, the deficit was slowly balancing out. , 
unless significant action was taken, the progress may have stop moving and become 
stagnate. Furthermore, Japan would have viewed this decision as weakness and not felt 
threatened while continuing its unfair practices. This is by far the antithesis of the 
agreement that the U. S. leaders wanted Japan to accept. 
Similarly, the U. S. could have gone to the discussion table and negotiated various 
agreements in the proposal. In the political arena, the U. S. automotive leaders wanted the 
government to take more decisive action rather than compromising its original proposal 
through negotiations. They felt the U. S. needed to show strength by standing firm and 
make Japan realize the concerns that were being overlooked needed to be addressed with 
gravity (Davis 1994). Though, economically, negotiations may have been helpful if 
Japan agreed to the proposal after adjustments were made and finally took extensive 
deregulatory action which would have affected the trade deficit in favor of the U. S. 
Perhaps, the affect may have been slight but at least the move to lower the gap would 
have continued. Most likely, this would have been a rather favorable diplomatic move. 
Japan would have had the opportunity to minimize any negative affects on its own 
economy by shoring down requirements in the proposal. They may have been able to 
keep some of the barriers that had benefited their companies and industries. 
On the other hand, the U. S. could have mken more extreme measure to obtain 
agreement of the deregulation proposal. Tariffs could have been threatened on 13 luxury 
cars that were imported from Japan (Kantor 1995). Politically, the U. S. would appear to 
be adamant in its request while determined to act yet still not have to resort to Super 301. 
The U. S. would only have limited the availability of imports from Japan while haven 
taken action to help alleviate unfairness in trade on the domestic territory. U. S. 
consumers would then have more reason to buy domestic automobiles and the industry 
would have increased competition on the domestic front (Kantor 1995). Hopefully, 
Japan would be alarmed by this action. Japan's luxury car industry would be strained 
since most are built in Japan and shipped to the U. S. The government may then be 
prompt to take the U. S. seriously. Japan may have deemed this course of action as an 
imposing complication and thereby accepted the deregulation proposal. 
The final alternative to be considered was to impose sanctions on imports under a 
trade provision, Super 301. For the U. S. public, their government had been patient 
enough with Japan and compliance with the proposal is of up most importance. The 
government would emerge as determined traders trying to solve the deficit problem, 
which politically was desirable. Though, the administration realized action must be 
taken, the U. S. auto industry would ultimately not benefit from sanctions that threaten to 
put Japanese companies out of business (Simison 1995). Economically, the lack of 
competition would have allowed U. S. companies to profit and lower the deficit, but if 
Japanese companies are severely hurt by sanctions, it may have had a negative impact on 
other areas of trade. Finally, many in the Clinton administration were concerned that if 
the U. S. proceeded with a Super 301 action on autos - the most politically sensitive trade 
sector for both notions - Japan may feel compelled to walk away from talks and 
completely reject the proposal (Davis 1994). This could have caused unnecessary 
strained relations between the countries. 
In the end, the U. S. chose to impose tariffs on luxury cars. Luckily, Japan 
complied with the proposal and the tariffs never were needed. It is interesting though to 
consider why the leaders of the U. S. chose tariffs over the other alternatives. I suspect 
that the different dimensions play distinct roles in the decision making process while 
political factors have more weight on the choice of the outcome. This dimension often 
has a stronger role when government leaders look at alternatives, 
Research Design 
In order to test my theory, I applied an analytical component that modeled 
foreign economic relations between the two countries. I incorporated an experimental 
design created by Dr. Alex Mintz, director of the Program in Foreign Policy Decision- 
Making at Texas A 4 M University. An important component of the Program is a nev, 
state-of-the-art experimental laboratory. The lab facilitates experimental studies in 
foreign policy decision making with an interactive computer simulation. As a first step, 
members of the Program have developed the Decision Board Simulator — a 
computerized interactive system that provides a new research platform for testing 
theories of foreign policy derision making (cybernetic theory, prospect theory. expected 
utility theory, the polihueristic theory of decision and more). The generic nature and 
programming flexibility of this platform allows researchers to conceivably develop 
countless scenarios of international crises, trade negotiations, and more. 
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Data File Scenarios gvlr 
For this project, I employed 26 students (subjects). The students were drawn 
from political science classes at Texas A A M University. The data needed for the 
experiment was mainly of qualitative nature, therefore large number of participants were 
not needed. Although some may argue that students do not represent decision making of 
higher capacity, A&M has performed research in which the results reveal that college 
students do actually follow similar thinking patterns as officers in prestigious mijitary 
schools. Overall, the use of students in the study should reveal accurate results. 
The format of the experiment was computer based. A scenario identically related 
to the dispute was devised and input into the computer simulation. Once the student 
Jogged into the system, they were allowed unlimited time to read the scenario before 
proceeding (See Appendix A). 
rade Bisp J pan & U. S. 
In the recent past, the US has had concerns with trade relations wtth Japan. As 
the japanese market has risen to a competitive nature with the US, the trade 
defici has increased dramatically. One particular area of importance is the 
automotive industry. In the late 1980s. automotive products made up almost 
half of the $ft0 billion trade deficit between the two countries (Wall Street, Jan 
1987). After restrictions were imposed, the deficit fell but currently still makes 
up 1/5 of the overall trade deficit with Japan. The United States governmnent 
needs to take actions to help balance the trade deficit and protect competition, 
Not only were Japanese companies out-selling US companies jkt the States 
with aggresstve pncing. but also US firm were counteringbaB 'tts to the 
Japanese market. The two main harness in the automotive industry dealt 
with sales of auto-parts in the US and automobile sales in japan, Even though 
the Japanese automakers built cars in the US. they relied heavily on parts 
imported from Japan. US suppliers were bei, ng overlooked and unable to 
compete with the existing ties. Likewtse, US suppliers were unable to gain 
market share in Japan because japanese manufacturers put extreme pressure 
on their dealers to carry domestic cars. The Japanese manufacturers also 
, , t:otstjriisa". ! 
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Afterwards, the subject advanced to the next screen, which contained the actual 
decision matrix (See Appendix B). The implication for each dimension of an alternative 
was contained in an information bin. The information was presented as an opinion of 
three different advisors: political, economical, and diplomatic. Each advisor gave a 
rating on the four alternatives from a range of — 10 (worst) to 10 (best). The student was 
allowed to view each bin once and return to the decision matrix. Each bin was allowed 
access only once. After reading as much or as little information as the subject deemed 
necessary, they chose an alternative that they felt would be the best decision based on 
the information given about the dispute. 
—  Navy =— 
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Subjects were encouraged not to use outside knowledge and only to rely on the 
information given in the scenario and decision board. Following the computer 
simulation, subjects were given a brief questionnaire that contained questions relating to 
the weight given to different dimensions for each alternative (See Appendix C). The 
questions for the questionnaire were devised after consultation with my advisor, which 
we felt, would request the information needed in the best format. After the experiment, I 
gave the group a short debriefing. 
Students were not asked for personal information and names were not used. All 
responses remained confidential and only an identification number was used to identify 
students. The use of the ID number was required to match results of the computer with 
the answers on the questionnaires. Each student's responses on paper as well as on the 
computer were later matched up in order to tabulate the results. The pertinent 
information in the results was then transferred to an Excel spreadsheet for better access 
and then graphed (See Appendix D). 
Following the graphing, I observed the information and drew conclusions for 
analysis from the results. The results I hoped to gain from this experiment were that 
there would be a recognizable primary choice of alternative among the subjects. Whether 
or not it was the same choice as that of the U. S. leaders, consistency in choice would 
reveal reliability in the experiment. Also, I anticipated patterns within the choices that 
wotdd prove theories about political decision-making. Yet, the main purpose of this 
experiment was to understand why the subjects made their decisions, then I can possibly 
find the stimulus behind the government's decision. By looking at the results, I could 
gain understanding in how the U. S. government made its decision to impose tariffs. 
ANALYSIS 
Preferred Option of Subjects 
Graph Observations 
~ Tariffs were the overwhelming alternative for over half of the subjects. 
~ Do nothing and sanctions were equally chosen by the fewest number of students. 
~ Negotiations, the second best alternative was correctly the second most chosen. 
Analysis 
First, these results validate the experiment's validity because the hypothetical best 
alternative in the experiment was also the actual best decision. Since most of the subjects 
view tariffs as the superior course of action, the response to the questionnaire in regards 
Figure 1 
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do nothing negotiate tariifs sanctions 
to this alternative will provide the most information on to decision-making. The 
reasoning behind students who chose this option will give us insight in what dimensions 
were deemed more important and how each dimension was taken into consideration. 
The students who choose tariffs all stated that some action was needed. These 
students felt that in order to actually reduce the deficit, more than just talk was required. 
The U. S. needed to take a strong stand and be progressive. Most students also 
recognized that out of the three options, tariffs were positively favored on all three 
dimensions. "The rating in the economic dimension was higher than the others, and the 
political dimension was positive. The diplomatic dimension was also not too bad. " ' 
' All quotes in the analysis are directly taken from the responses obtained in the questionnaire. 
Alternative Rejected by Subjects 
Graph Observations 
~ None of the subjects chose negotiations as the worst alternative. 
~ The majority felt that doing nothing was the worst action the government could take. 
~ There are many that saw sanctions as the pitfall in this dispute. 
Analysis 
Almost all the subjects in the experiment chose to do nothing or to impose 
sanctions as the alternatives that were rejected outright. This shows that the need to act 
yet act without being too extreme was important in the decision-making. To be concise, I 
wanted to look at the reasons behind the decision to not choose an alternative in the 
same light as looking at reasons to choose an alternative in order to get a comprehensive 
Figure 2 
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analysis. 
Many of the responses the subjects gave entailed concern for action. From all 
dimension standpoints, doing nothing was the worst choice because it did nothing to 
help the deficit, which is the main priority of the proposal and the task at hand. Yet, all 
courses of action must be considered and allowing the government to sit back and be 
complacent about an international matter is certainly conceivable. Still, the decision to 
do nothing clearly would not be acceptable to all three advisors. Similarly, doing nothing 
was comparable to ignoring the problem for most respondents. "Since there is an 
obvious problem, it needs to be addressed in some manner". 
The second most rejected alternative was to impose sanctions on Japan. This 
action was deemed unfavorable because it could cause potential conflicts. The students 
felt that sanctions might ultimately hurt the economies of both countries. The businesses 
on both sides could suffer from lack of communication. Of course, the consumer would 
be hurt the most with the lack of choice among options. Likewise, there was sincere 
concern over relations between the nations. "There is no need to punish or insult Japan". 
Several of the respondents felt that sanctions would have a negative impact on 
international interaction. 
16 
Weight Given to Advisors by Subjects who Chose Tariffs 
Graph Observations 
~ Overall, the dimension that has the highest average is the economic dimension. 
~ Similarly, it appears that diplomatic weight was considered the least in the overall 
calculations. 
~ Political factors are still strongly considered but do not win over the other two 
dimensions as either most important or least important. 
Analysis 
The alternative that was chosen by the most subjects also has another strong 
indicator. Most of these subjects valued economic aspects most influential in decision 
making while at the same time keeping political factors close at hand. This leads me to 
believe that financial concerns are of higher priority than the domestic context or 
international relations. The subjects were less burdened by souring relations with a 
12 
Figure 3 
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Subjects who Chose Tariffs 
apolitical weight ~ economic weight CI diplomatic weight 
competing country and wanted more to help the economy, consumers, and industries in 
the U. S. 
Many of the responses contained desire to see action and were wearisome of 
destroying relations with Japan through sanctions. These subjects felt in order to help the 
trading gap, some action must be taken. Yet, the majority was clear that doing nothing 
was by far the worst decision if anything was to be done about the trade deficit. 
Response after response stated that politically, this was the best alternative and that is 
why it was chosen. Likewise, they felt that since the other two dimensions were not as 
negatively affected as in other alternatives, tariffs were overwhelmingly the safe course 
of action. These subjects shied away from the other alternatives that contained negative 
impacts in any of the dimensions. Many also felt that imposing tariffs instead of harsh 
sanctions was a better compromise and would be able to produce more results. The 
effect would be two-fold. One, it would help balance the deficit and two, it would scare 
Japan into action. 
Most surprising in these results was that the economic dimension faired higher 
than the political dimension (average: political = 7. 41, economic = 7. 59, diplomatic = 
5. 94). Although, the subjects claimed that the alternative was chosen based on high 
political concerns, it is evident that economic issues were the prevailing factor. 
Likewise, the standard deviation (political = 2. 03, economic = 1. 54, diplomatic = L85) 
in the economic dimension reveals that high weight given to economics was a more 
uniform decision. Overall, the strongest influence came from the economic dimension. 
Weight Given to Advisor by Subjects who chose Negotiations 
Graph Observations 
~ The dimension that carries the most weight is the diplomatic dimension. 
~ Political weight is the lowest 6 times out of 8. 
~ Economic weight the median 6 times out of 8. 
Analysis 
This graph reveals that when considering negotiations, the diplomatic &hmension 
was more pervasive. It would make sense that the students who considered negotiations 
a better option gave more weight to the diplomatic advisor. Most of these students also 
considered the political issue least important. I found this consistency in thought 
processing valuable to my theory of decision making. For those who found negotiations 
Figure 4 
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favorable, there is a strong pattern among the students that diplomatic relations came 
first, then economic, and finally political relations. 
These students were most concerned with maintaining benevolent relations 
between the countries. "It seems harsh sanctions or tariffs would jeopardize 
relation. . . negotiations seem like the best way to reduce the deficit". With peaceful 
discussion, the rise of conflicts was less likely and thus more advantageous. 
Negotiations are a form of action in that it calls to attention the dispute and addresses a 
problem, While Japan would recognize the need for reform, they would also have the 
opportunity to be heard. Mostly, negotiations were considered to be more fair and 
friendly. 
As for economic matters, the response was that neither economy would be 
affected negatively and continued competition under a ratified proposal would only be 
beneficial. "Tariffs and sanctions may affect other areas of trade not only in the 
particular dispute which may have a negative impact on the overall economies of the 
countries". There would be a more likely chance to decrease the deficit without 
estranging relations with Japan. "It is extremely important not to alienate trade partners 
in a globalize and free market". 
20 
Weight Given to Advisors by Subjects who chose Sanctions 
Graph Observations 
~ No weight was given to the diplomatic advisor. 
Equal weight was given to both the political and economic advisor. 
Analysis 
The student who chose to impose sanctions wanted to do so in order to "level the 
playing field". In this case, the diplomatic dimension is the one that is given no 
consideration. Yet, in order to be effective in an international arena, once must take into 
account the other parties involved. I feel that this subject was not taking in the entire 
situation by not considering the effect the choice would have on an international level. 
Figure 5 
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Weight Given to Advisors by Subjects who chose to Do Nothing 
Graph Observations 
~ No political weight was given to advisors. 
~ The most concern centered on economics. 
Analysis 
The student who chose to do nothing admitted that they were a libertarian and 
did not believe that the federal government should be involved in the auto industry. This 
person also gave absolutely no weight to the political advisor and extremely little weight 
to the diplomatic advisor in the scenario, the two key advisors that would have 
knowledge of foreign affairs. Since this is an international matter, the fact that he gave 
no thought to the impact of these dimensions leads me to believe that this subject did not 
base their decision on what course of action to eke solely on the information given in 
the scenario. Therefore, I am tempted to throw out this data yet I think it proves a point 
that well-informed and rational decision makers in our governmental system would not 
have chosen this course of action because it was not considerate of the prevailing factors 
at play. 
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Case Study 
In the recent past, the U. S. has had concerns with trade agreements with Japan. 
As the Japanese market rose to a competitive nature with the U. S. , the trade deficit has 
increased dramatically. One particular area of importance is the automotive industry. In 
late 1980s, automotive products made up half of the $60 billion trade deficit between the 
two countries (Schlesinger 1987). After restrictions were imposed, the deficit fell but 
currently still makes up I/5 of the overall trade deficit with Japan. The gap stems from 
several distinct sources that limit U. S. competitiveness in the Japanese market. The 
United States government needed to take action to help balance the trade deficit and 
protect competition for U. S. companies. 
The worrisome hade deficit came into the limelight in the early 1980s when it 
was clear that Japanese automobile exports were increasing at a precipitous rate. Three 
main events allowed the Japan market to take a strong foothold in the automobile 
industry. In the late 1970s, Japan implemented capital liberalization and eliminated the 
ceiling on foreign investments of Japanese companies. This came after a General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations round in June of 1967 when 
President Kennedy fought for across-the-board tariff reductions by 50'/0 during the five 
years beginning from July 1968 (Capital 1999). As a result, tariffs were eventually 
reduced to 0'/0 for Japanese automobiles, the first instance of no tariffs on imports for a 
leading industrialized nation. This began the advent of an era of free movement of 
capital that provided Japanese automobile manufacturers with an opportunity to 
restructure through mergers and the formation of business groups in order to ensure the 
23 
mass production that was necessary for survival in international competition (Capital) 
1999). Thus, Japan became the leading export of automobiles to the U. S. 
This success also followed the oil crisis of 1973, which adversely affected the 
entire global economy, but the impact on Japan was especially severe. Japan relied on 
the Middle East for over 80'ro of its oil and the reduction in oil production caused great 
alarm in industries throughout Japan but mostly in the automotive industry. Oil prices 
increase over 217 10 and the GNP of Japan revealed first time negative growth. These 
conditions caused great hardship on the automobile industry as sales dropped abruptly. 
Japan, however, was able to prevail over the impact of the oil crisis through strict cost 
reduction measures, energy and resource conservation initiatives, and persistent export 
promotion efforts in a harsh economic climate (Maturing 1999). This led to Japan 
producing lighter weight vehicles, which were more fuel eAicient and highly popular in 
the U. S. as well as competitive in price. "After the gasoline crisis of 1979, the U. S. 
demand for passenger cars plummeted 9. 3 million cars to 6. 6 million in 
1980. While demand for passenger cars as a whole declined, demand for fuel-efficient 
compact and subcompact models did not decline as much" (Tsurumi 1982). This 
reaction to the oil crisis provided a preliminary step for conservation. With its demand 
for improved performance and environment-friendly passenger cars on the rise, Japan 
became a leader of international growth. 
Now, a leading industrial powerhouse, not only were Japanese companies out- 
selling U. S. companies in the States with aggressive pricing, but also U. S. firms were 
countering barriers to the Japanese market. "Much like the United States, Japan has a 
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mature motor vehicle market that is an unlikely prospect for long term growth; it is 
however, a large market, and improved access is of great interest to the U. S. " (Gott 
1999). The two main barriers in the automotive industry dealt with sales of auto-parts in 
the U. S. and automobile sales in Japan. Even though the Japanese automakers built cars 
in the U. S. , they relied heavily on parts imported from Japan. "U. S. auto-parts makers 
say they are unfairly shut out of the Japanese market because of the long-term close 
relationship between Japanese assemblers and suppliers" (Schlesinger 1990). U. S. 
suppliers were being overlooked and were unable to compete with the existing ties 
between manufacturer and supplier. "Parts imports from Japan, which have increased to 
supply the growing number of U. S. -produced Japanese vehicles, have accounted for the 
vast majority of the U. S. deficit in automotive parts trade since the mid-1980s (Gaines 
1999). 
Likewise, U. S. automakers were unable to gain market share in Japan because 
Japanese manufacturers put exneme pressure on their dealers to carry domestic cars. In 
an effort not to loose good relations with the manufacturers, dealers complied with the 
demands and seldom allowed foreign cars on the lots. These "corporate alliances and 
exclusive buyer-seller networks" inevitably impeded foreign competition. The Japanese 
Government also allowed for excessive regulation in the industry. Examples of 
excessive regulation include price controls, unique standards, and burdensome testing 
and certification requirements. These practices were the result of privatization of 
regulation. "The Government of Japan delegates, both formally and informally, 
governmental or public policy functions, such as industry standard development product 
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certifications and entry authorizations, to industry associations and other business related 
organizations that are generally not under any obligation to conduct their operations in 
an open, transparent and non-discriminatory manner or to include foreign firms in their 
deliberations" (United States 1999). Therefore, the number of foreign cars was able to be 
heavily restricted causing limited competition. These practices have led to such an 
alarming trade deficit between the countries that it caused U. S. officials to take action. 
Initially, Japan denied any unfair practices. Later, during the early 80s, under 
pressure and in an effort to avoid being called an unfair trader, the Japanese government 
agreed to try to open their market to more imports of automobiles. "Japan is trying to 
strengthen its position by saying it wants a fundamental change in the current 
confrontational trading relationship, where the U. S. issues a threat, Japan initially denies 
the problem then caves in under intense pressure at the last minute" (Schlesinger 1990). 
Japan complied with U. S. trade agreements to limit the number of exports to the U. S. to 
2. 3 million vehicles annually. Japan also negotiated additional auto-parts bought from 
U. S. suppliers. In 1992, the purchases rose from $2. 5 billion to $13. 6 billion, a 
substantial amount but still not enough to close the trade gap (Templin 1993). Even with 
Japan*s passive cooperation, the trade deficit hovered over $9 billion. 
The U. S. called for stronger measures to balance the trade deficit in the form of a 
deregulation proposal. The proposal essentially seeks to eliminate the unfair practices by 
Japanese companies. The U. S. felt that compliance with the proposal would show 
Japan's desire for progress. "The objectives of the 1995 U. S. -Japan Automotive 
Agreement are to eliminate market access barriers and significantly expand sales 
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opportunities in this sector. Under the Agreement, [the U. S. wanted] the Japanese 
Government to commit to improve access for foreign vehicle manulacturers, expand 
opportunities for U. S. original equipment parts manufacturers in Japan and the United 
States, and eliminate regulations that restrict access for U. S. automotive parts suppliers 
to the Japanese repair market" (United States 1999). 
Yet, for the Japanese government the proposal is too demanding and too 
progressive. Therefore, the Prime Minister of Japan offered a partial settlement of the 
automotive dispute with a proposal that contains plans to help equal Japanese auto 
dealers with foreign carmakers. Still, U. S. officials have plans to name "priority" areas 
for trade pressure and possible sanctions under a trade-law provision known as Super 
301. According to United States Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, "Japan's interim 
package of deregulation measures announced on March 10. . . falls short of the 
comprehensive deregulation objectives set out by the Japanese Government last year" 
(Kantor 1995). He deems the package deficient because it fails to adequately address 
main concerns of the U. S. "Only by fully opening and deregulating its auto and auto 
parts sector will Japan foster the creation of a truly competitive automotive market, 
generating further progress under the Automotive Agreement and helping to spur 
Japanese economic growth" (U. S. Department of Commerce 1999). Ultimately, the U. S. 
stance is to not accept the interim package and gain compliance with the proposal 
already set out by the U. S. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The results from the experiment show unambiguous patterns and strong 
consistency. The different groups of students who chose the same alternatives tended to 
weigh the dimensions similarly. Likewise, the students who chose the less favorable 
alternatives gave the highest weight to the other dimensions. The decision most favored 
in the experiment is also the decision most likely to have been taken by the U. S. leaders. 
The alternatives deemed the worst decision were also the least likely ones that would 
have been taken by the government. This outcome shows reliability in the experiment to 
reveal accurate results. 
For the subjects, each alternative offered a different dimension as most 
important. The students who chose to impose tariffs gave the most weight to the 
economic advisor while the students who chose negotiations considered diplomatic 
relations the most important. Then, there were the students who chose to do nothing or 
sanctions who gave little or no weight to the political or diplomatic dimension. This 
strong pattern proves that certain alternatives play a more important role when making 
decisions on international issues. 
Overall, the students who weighed all the dimensions carefully and considered 
the alternatives from the three different angles, made the more desirable decision with 
respect to international affairs. The students who did not consider all possibilities or took 
in outside information made the more unlikely decisions. 
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Conclusion 
Although my goal was to find a pattern, I was mistaken in the pattern that I 
thought would occur. There was strong unity in the decision for each alternative based 
on the suggestions of the advisors. Yet, the unity for the dimensions that I deemed more 
influential did not exist. 
It is not surprising that the students who chose to negotiate did so with a greatest 
emphasis on diplomatic concern. I anticipated this result and am confident in its 
suggestion. On the other hand, the dimension that I thought would prove strongest for 
the students who chose tariffs would be the political dimension. Yet, the statistics show 
that students were more influenced by economic issues. Although the results do not 
show a large discrepancy between the two influences, my hypothesis that politics would 
play a greater role in decision-making is wrong. 
Finally, I am encouraged to find that there are patterns to decision making. These 
patterns exist in the relative importance of influences. Various decisions yield different 
degree of weight on certain alternatives. Although a definite pattern of dimension versus 
decision needs further research, I conclude that the pattern is present, recognizable, and 
almost predictable. These patterns can be further analyzed in order to help create 
understanding in political decision-making. This understanding can ultimately be used to 
help maintain friendly relations and strong economic markets, which are vital today 
especially between the U. S. and Japan. 
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APPENDIX A 
Scenario for Decision Board 
In the recent past, the U. S. has had problems with trade relations with Japan. As 
the Japanese market has risen to a competitive nature with the U. S. , the trade deficit has 
increased dramatically. One particular area of importance is the automotive industry. In 
the late 1980's, automotive products made up half of the $60 billion trade deficit 
between the two countries (Schlesinger 1987). After restrictions were imposed, the 
deficit fell but currently still makes up I/5 of the overall trade deficit with Japan. The 
United States government needs to take action to help balance the trade deficit and 
protect competition. 
Not only were Japanese companies out-selling U. S. companies in the States with 
aggressive pricing, but also U. S. firms were countering barriers to the Japanese market. 
The two main barriers in the automotive industry dealt with sales of auto-parts in the 
U. S. and automobile sales in Japan. Even though the Japanese automakers built cars in 
the U. S. , they relied heavily on parts imported from Japan. U. S. suppliers were being 
overlooked and were unable to compete with the existing ties. Likewise, U. S. 
automakers were unable to gain market share in Japan because Japanese manufacturers 
put extreme pressure on their dealers to carry domestic cars. The Japanese manufacturers 
also lobbied for higher inspection and certification for the sale of non-Japanese vehicles. 
Therefore, the number of foreign cars was able to be heavily restricted causing limited 
competition (Schlesinger 1990). These practices have led to such an alarming trade 
deficit between the countries that caused U. S. officials to take action. 
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Initially, Japan denied any unfair practices. Later, during the early 80s, under 
pressure and in an effort to avoid being called an unfair trader, the Japanese government 
agreed to ny to open their market to more imports of automobiles. "Japan is trying to 
strengthen its position by saying it wants a fundamental change in the current 
confrontational trading relationship, where the U. S. issues a threat, Japan initially denies 
the problem, then caves in under intense pressure at the last minute" (Schlesinger1990). 
Japan complied with U. S. trade agreements to limit the number of exports to the U. S. to 
2. 3 million vehicles annually. Japan also negotiated additional auto-parts bought from 
U. S. suppliers. In 1992, the purchases rose from $2. 5 billion to $13. 6 billion, a 
substantial amount but still not enough to close the trade gap (Templin 1993). Even with 
Japan's passive cooperation, the trade deficit hovers over $9 billion. 
The U. S. has called for stronger measures to balance the trade deficit in the form 
of a deregulation proposal. The proposal essentially seeks to eliminate the unfair 
practices by Japanese companies. The U. S. feels compliance with the proposal would 
show Japan's desire for progress. Yet, for the Japanese government, the proposal is too 
demanding and too progressive. Therefore, the Prime Minister of Japan offered a partial 
settlement of the automotive dispute with a proposal that contains plans to help equal 
Japanese auto dealers with foreign carmakers. In the mean time, U. S. officials have plans 
to name "priority" areas for trade pressure and possible sanctions under a trade-law 
provision known as Super 301. 
International trade is of vital importance for the U. S. economy. As the President 
of the U. S. , you must decide on a course of action to take on the trade dispute with Japan 
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in regards to the automotive industry. You have four advisors who are assisting you with 
information. The political advisor assists you with public perception of the presidential 
office and oversees satisfaction of domestic constituents. He has contacts with 
representatives from the automotive indusny and knows the effects of trade agreements 
and disputes on the industry. You also have an economic advisor who is familiar with 
the deficit situation and possible problems and solutions. Next, the Secretary of State is 
your foreign affairs advisor who has ties with the Japanese government and knows their 
views on the situation. As the President, you will hold a meeting and hear advice from 
these advisors before making a decision. As the President, you can choose to do nothing, 
negotiate an agreement, impose tariffs on luxury cars, or sanction. 
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APPENDIX B 
Alternatives for Decision Board 
Political 
Advisor 
Do Nothing 
"The leaders in 
the US 
automotive 
industry are 
tired of lack of 
fair 
competition 
that exists and 
want the 
government to 
take a stand 
and fight for 
more fair 
trading. '* 
I would rate 
this alternative 
a — g. 
Negotiate proposal 
"V. S. automobile leaders 
want to take more decisive 
action than compromising 
its original proposal 
through negotiations. The 
industry wants stronger 
measures and does not 
want to see the 
government back down to 
Japanese demands. 
Negotiations would lessen 
the urgency and necessity 
of the proposal. " 
I would rate this 
alternative a — 7. 
Impose Tariffs 
"The U. S. would appear 
to be adamant in its 
request while determined 
to act yet still not have to 
resort to Super 301. The 
U. S. would only limit the 
availability of imports 
&om Japan while having 
taken action to help 
alleviate unfairness in 
trade on the domestic 
territory. " 
I would rate this 
alternative a 7. 
Impose Sanction 
"Ultimately, the U S 
government feels they have been 
patient enough with Japan and 
wants compliance with the 
deregulation proposal. The 
government would be seen to 
have taken decisive action in an 
effort to help the U. S. auto 
industry. " 
I would rale this alternative a 5. 
Economical 
Advisor 
"The deficit 
will not 
decrease and 
may possibly 
increase if 
nothing is 
done. " 
I would rate 
this alternative 
a — 8, 
"Perhaps Japan would 
agree to the proposal afier 
adjustments are made and 
take deregulatory actions 
and the trade deficit would 
benefit in favor of the U. S. 
slightly. " 
I would rate this 
alternative a 2. 
"U. S. consumers may 
have more reason to buy 
domestic automobiles 
and the industry will 
have decreased 
competition on the 
domestic front" 
I would rate this 
alternative a 4. 
"The administration realizes 
action must be taken but the U. S. 
automakers will ultimately not 
benefit from sanctions that 
threaten to put Japanese 
companies out of business. 
Although, the lack of 
compeiition would allow U. S. 
companies to profit and lower 
the deficit, if Japanese 
companies me severely hurt by 
sanctions, it may have a negative 
impact. on other areas of trade. * 
I would rate this alternative a -2 
Diplomatic 
Advisor 
Japan would 
view this as 
weakness and 
not feel 
threatened 
while 
continuing its 
unfair 
practices. 
I would rate 
this alternative 
a6. 
"Japan wants the 
opportunity to minimize 
the negative affects on its 
economy by shoring down 
requirements in the 
proposal. *' 
I would rate this 
alternative a 7. 
"Japan's luxury car 
industry would be 
strained and thus prompt 
the government to take 
the U. S. seriously. Japan 
would deem this course 
of action an imposing 
complication and thereby 
accept the proposal. " 
I would rate this 
alternative a W . 
"Many in the Cfinton 
administration are concerned 
that if the U. S. proceeds with a 
Super 301 action on autos — the 
most politically sensitive trade 
sector for both nations — Japan 
may feel compelled to walk 
away from talks". 
I would rate this alternative a 
— 7. 
APPENDIX C 
Experimental Questionnaire 
Please write down your experimental ID number found on your index card. 
1. Please weight the importance you attribute to each of the three advisors? 
a. Political 
Low Weight 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
b. Economic 
Low Weight 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
c. Diplomatic 
Low Weight 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
2. Which alternative did you choose and why? 
Based on 
a. Political 
Low Weight 
b. Economic 
Low Weight 
c. Diplomatic 
Low Weight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 HighWeight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
3. Which alternative did you reject out right and why? 
Based on 
a. Political 
Low Weight 
b. Economic 
Low Weight 
c. Diplomatic 
Low Weight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 High Weight 
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APPENDIX D 
Results of Experiment on Excel 
ID ¹ ¹ of 
Cells 
choice pol 
weight 
econ 
weight 
dip 
weight 
rejected pol 
weight 
econ 
weight 
dip overall 
weight pol 
overall 
econ 
overall 
dip 
12 do nothing sanctions 
12 tanffs 5 do nothing 
tariffs 
12 negotiate 
8 negotiate 
tariffs 
tariffs 
10 tariffs 
10 
3 do nothmg 
10 do nothing 
10 do nothing 
5 do nothing 
6 do nothing 
5 do nothing 
10 
10 
10 10 
10 
10 
10 
tariffs sanctions 10 
10 10 sanction 10 10 0 do nothing 10 10 10 10 
12 tartffs 7 do nothing 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
8 negotiate 
12 negotiate 
tariffs 
tariffs 
8 negotiate 
sanctions 
7 do nothing 
7 do nothing 
sanctions 
10 
10 
17 12 tariffs 4 do nothing 
18 tariffs sanctions 
19 12 negotiate do nothing 10 
20 9 negotiate sanctions 
21 10 tariffs 9 do nothing 
23 12 tariffs 7 do nothillg 
24 12 tariffs do nothing 10 10 10 
12 tariffs sanctions 
27 12 sanctions 
29 
30 
3 negotiate 
10 tariffs 
sanctions 
6 do nothing 
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